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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAHf 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
GEORGE CASH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860014 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the jury a 
lesser included offense instruction. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, George Cash, was charged with theftf a 
second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1978), and 
with being a habitual criminal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1001 
(1978) (R. 1, 19). 
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second 
degree felony theft (R. 18). Although the record indicates that 
the trial court held a postconviction hearing on the habitual 
criminal charge, the record does not disclose any disposition on 
that charge (R. 128-35). The court sentenced defendant to a term 
of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the theft 
(R. 22). 
STATEMENT QjF FACTS 
In August 1985, Terry Deamer arranged with Car-a-Sell, 
a used car dealership in Ogden, Utah, to sell on consignment his 
black 1976 Chevrolet Corvette (R. 43). On the 19th of August, 
defendant visited the Car-a-Sell lot, test drove Mr, Deamer1s 
Corvette, spoke with a salesman about purchasing the vehicle, and 
subsequently deposited $50 in order to hold it. Defendant told 
the salesman that he had won a large sum of money gambling and 
wished to purchase the Corvette (R. 50-56, 84, 109). 
The next day at closing time, defendant returned to 
Car-a-Sell and filled out a credit application, giving a false 
name and address (R. 58, 87, 110-111). Although defendant knew 
he had insufficient funds to purchase the vehicle, he 
nevertheless made arrangements to come back to Car-a-Sell the 
next day in order to close the deal. However, before leaving, 
defendant knowingly put the keys to the Corvette into his pocket 
(R. 61, 88, 109, 112). 
Later that night, defendant returned to Car-a-Sell, 
entered the Corvette without authorization, started it and drove 
it off the lot, fully realizing that the car was not rightfully 
his. He drove out of Ogden and, once in Wyoming, replaced the 
license plates on the vehicle with his personalized plates that 
said "E Z Cash" (R. 78, 88-89, 112-113). He traveled through 
several western states enroute to Rockport, Texas, his hometown. 
After spending four days in Rockport, defendant resumed his trip, 
traveling through New Mexico and Arizona (R. 90-100). 
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Upon arriving in Kingman, Arizona, defendant reportedly 
had $400 in cash* He registered at a motel in Kingman for the 
period of September 5th to 11th (R. 115) . On September 6th, a 
Kingman City police officer arrested defendant after stopping him 
and determining that his vehicle had been reported stolen. 
Defendant told the officer that he had wanted a Corvette since 
the time he was fourteen-years-old and that he had purchased the 
vehicle* Defendant, who had filled out a job application while 
in Kingman, also told the officer that he intended to settle 
there (R. 65-68, 122). 
At trial, defendant, although admitting that he 
exercised unauthorized control over the Corvette, testified that 
he intended to use it only temporarily. He stated that he wished 
to show off the car to family and friends and would have 
eventually returned it. He also claimed to have meticulously 
cared for the car, washing and waxing it regularly and paying for 
necessary repairs (R. 101-102, 121). Finally, he denied that he 
ever planned to settle in Kingman, maintaining that he had only 
wanted to find spot work there and then leave (R. 114-118). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant has not included in the record on 
appeal his requested instruction on joy riding, the denial of 
which he challenges on appeal, this Court should not consider his 
assignment of error. 
Even if the Court were to reach the issue, defendants 
argument is without merit. Assuming that, under the first prong 
of the test set forth in State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1983), there was the requisite relationship between the pertinent 
theft and joy riding statutes, there was still no rational basis 
in the evidence presented at defendant's trial for acquitting him 
of theft and convicting him of joy riding. Therefore, the trial 
court properly denied defendant's request for an instruction on 
joy riding. 
ARGUMENT 
PPiyr I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT INCLUDED HIS REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL, THE 
COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW HIS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO GIVE THE INSTRUCTION. 
The record on appeal contains neither the jury 
instructions given to the jury nor those that defendant 
apparently requested. Nevertheless, defendant argues on appeal 
that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court 
refused to give his requested lesser included offense instruction 
on the crime defined in UTAH CODE ANN. S 41-1-109 (Supp. 1985) 
(amended 1986) . 
Although there is some limited discussion in the record 
about defendant's proposed instruction (R. 24), that discussion 
only discloses that it referred to § 41-1-109; it does not make 
clear what the text of the instruction was. This Court has 
repeatedly stated that it will not review the trial courtfs 
allegedly erroneous denial of a defendant's requested instruction 
unless the instruction is included in the record on appeal. 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1201 (Utah 1984); State v. Knill, 
656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982). Because defendant has not 
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included his requested instruction in the record, the Court 
should not consider his assignment of error. 
Even if the Court were to consider defendant's claim, 
the trial court properly refused to give an instruction under § 
41-1-109. In order to receive a lesser included offense 
instruction, a defendant must show: (1) the elements of both the 
greater and lesser offenses are related and there is some overlap 
of the evidence required to establish the commission of each 
offense; and (2) the evidence provides a rational basis for both 
acquitting of the greater offense and convicting of the lesser 
included offense. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Utah 
1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(3)(a) and (4) (1978). Although 
defendant may have satisfied the first prong of the Baker test, 
he clearly failed to satisfy the second prong. 
The elements of theft are: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exer-
cises unauthorized control over the property 
of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1978). In comparison, the version of 
S 41-1-109 (the "joy riding" statute) in effect at the time of 
defendant's offense provided in pertinent part:1 
(1) Any person who takes or drives a vehicle, 
not his own, without the consent of the owner 
or lawful custodian and with intent to 
temporarily deprive the owner or lawful 
custodian of possession of the vehicle, and 
returns the vehicle to the owner or lawful 
custodian within 24 hours of the taking is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(2) An offense under this section is a 
third degree felony if the person returns 
the vehicle more than 24 hours after the 
taking. 
Given this Court's rather expansive application of Baker's first 
prong, see, e.g.. State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984) 
(finding an overlap under Baker between assault and aggravated 
kidnapping), the requisite overlap probably existed between the 
1983 version of § 41-1-109 and § 76-6-404. CJL. State v. Cornish. 
568 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) (holding that the offense defined in the 
pre-1983 version of S 41-1-109 was a lesser included offense of 
theft). However, the 1983 version of § 41-1-109 had as a 
necessary element the return of the vehicle to its "owner or 
1
 In his brief defendant erroneously states that this version of 
S 41-1-109 is currently in effect. See Brief of Appellant at 5. 
Section 41-1-109 was amended in 1986 (see 1986 Utah Laws ch. 32, 
S 1) and now provides in relevant part: 
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized control over 
a vehicle, not his own, without the consent of the 
owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily 
deprive the owner or lawful custodian of possession of 
the vehicle, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) An offense under this section is a third-degree 
felony if the actor does not return the vehicle to 
the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after 
the exercise of unauthorized control. 
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lawful custodian."2 TO read it otherwise, would be to ignore the 
plain language of the statute. See State v. Fontana* 680 P.2d 
1042, 1046 (Utah 1984) (Court has "statutory duty to construe the 
provisions of the Criminal Code •according to the fair import of 
their terms to promote justice and to effect the • . • general 
purposes of section 76-1-104'"); Granite School District v. Salt 
Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) ("terms of a statute 
are used advisedly and should be given an interpretation and 
application which is in accord with their usually accepted 
meanings"). On appeal, defendant points to no legislative 
history or any other source to support his position that the 1983 
version of § 41-1-109 did not, as a literal reading would 
indicate, include return of the vehicle as an element of the 
offense defined. Because the evidence did not, under anyone's 
interpretation, establish that defendant returned the vehicle, 
the second prong of the Baker test was not met. When arrested, 
defendant had the car hundreds of miles away from Ogden in 
Kingman, Arizona; thus, there was no rational basis in the 
evidence to acquit defendant of theft and to convict him of joy 
riding. This is precisely the conclusion reached by the trial 
court (R. 124). 
Finally, defendant cites no authority in support of his 
suggestion that he could be convicted under § 41-1-109, even 
without a return of the vehicle, because the police, by arresting 
him, thwarted his efforts to do so. The plain language of the 
2
 This is not true of the pre-1983 version (see UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-1-109 (1981)) or the current version (see fn. 1). 
statute certainly does not support such a conclusion. On the 
issue of police intervention, the trial court correctly 
concluded: 
It seems to me that the reason for the change 
[in the statute! is to encourage the return 
of vehicles. If you get caught before you 
return it, those are the breaks. . . . There 
is nothing in [the statute] that says attempted 
to return and was thwarted in that effort. 
It just simply says the offense is a third 
degree felony if the vehicle is returned more 
than 24 hours after it happened. It didn*t 
happen. 
(R. 105). 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the trial court 
properly refused to give defendant's requested instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. , 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J ^ d a y of September, 
1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 0 
Assistant Attorney General 
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